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Introduction
The publication of Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger’s book  Situated Learning  in the 
early  1990s  generated  widespread  interest  amongst  educational  researchers  in 
analysing  the  influence  of  context  on  learning.  Up until  that  point,  the  dominant 
influence of cognitive psychology, with its emphasis on mentalistic explanations of 
the mind based on the manipulation of representations,  meant that there were few 
discussions  of the influence  of  context  in contemporary learning theory,  let  alone 
vocational/professional education (hereafter VE).
Lave and Wenger’s book resulted in a profound reappraisal in VE as regards how to 
research workplace learning. Researchers moved away from analysing the vocational 
curriculum,  vocational  assessment  and  vocational  pedagogy  and  towards  the 
production of naturalistic accounts of workplace learning (see the edited collections 
by Evans et al. 2002; Rainbird et al. 2003). This interest in analysing the context of 
learning has been extended in VE by drawing on activity theory to reconceptualise the 
transfer of knowledge in VE as ‘transition and boundary crossing’ within and between 
contexts (Tuomi-Gröhn and Engeström 2003).
The focus  of  this  paper  is  a  neglected  feature  of  recent  work in  VE: the relation 
between  theory  (as  represented  by  the  knowledge  provided  by  the  vocational 
curriculum) and workplace practice.  This paper approaches this  topic from a neo-
Vygotksian  perspective.  It  maintains  that  in  concentrating  predominantly  on  the 
processes of, environments for and outcomes of situated learning, many researchers 
have  overlooked  the  relation  between  content  of  vocational  and  curricula  and 
workplace  practice:  a  relation  that  has  historically  been  deemed  to  be  central  to 
vocational formation (Winch 2000). 
The cornerstone of the position articulated in the paper is as follows. That learning to 
move between the contexts  of education and work presupposes  that  we grasp the 
interdependence of theory and practice; and, that grasping this interdependence raises 
new questions and issues about the relation between vocational curriculum, vocational 
pedagogy and workplaces. The paper argues that the reason that writers have glossed 
over the relation between theory and practice can be attribute to Kant’s legacy in post-
Lave and Wenger VE. The paper maintains that Kant’s ideas have exercised a hidden 
influence on the way in which writers working in the ‘situated’ tradition in VE (Billett 
2001; 2003) or who are critical  of that tradition (Young 2003) have construed the 
relation between theory and practice in VE. The net effect of these positions is to 
either leave learners locked into practice and cut-off from theory or with the dilemma 
of attempting to ‘connect’ theory and practice. 
In contrast, the paper argues that when Vygotsky’s concept of mediation is allied to 
the recent work of Robert Brandom and John McDowell, it is possible to formulate a 
non-dualisitic conception of the relation between mind and world. The great merit of 
this conception is that it provides a way to not only go beyond the Kantian separation 
of  mind,  but  also  to  grasp the  interdependency of  theory and practice  and hence 
theoretical and everyday concepst. The paper concludes by outlining the implications 
of this claim for vocational curriculum and vocational pedagogy. 
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Mind and world, theory and practice
The origins of the philosophical basis for the separation of mind and world
The origin of the separation of mind and world in philosophy is widely attributed to 
Descartes.  Nevertheless,  most  contemporary philosophers acknowledge that Kant’s 
attempt to overcome the Cartesian split constitute the starting point in the modern era 
for any re-thinking of the relation between mind and world (McDowell 1994; Rorty 
1978).
The basis of Kant (1929) resolution of the mind world dualism was to invoke the 
distinction between ‘scheme’ and ‘content’ (Thornton 2004: 10). This distinction was 
Kant’s way of conceiving of the relation of language or thought and the natural and 
social world which he assumed could be understood in isolation from one another. 
The totality of empirical beliefs that constitute a worldview is, for Kant, the result of 
the using the concepts that make up the scheme to organise our understanding of the 
world. Put simply, to ground knowledge we have to be able to synthesise scheme and 
content.
The  logic  of  Kant’s  argument  about  synthesis  compelled  him  to  confront  the 
‘perennial question’of the relation between theory and practice (Derry 2003: 143). 
The starting point for Kant’s exploration of this issue was his insight that ‘thoughts 
without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind’ (Kant 1929: 93 
B75, A51). To explain the way in which concepts relate to objects, Kant distinguished 
between the human faculties of ‘receptivity’  and ‘spontaneity’.  Kant argued that it 
was the interplay between these faculties that enabled us to relate scheme and content 
(Thornton 2004: 211). 
If  the  receptivity of our mind, its  power of  receiving representations in so far  as it  is  in any way 
affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind’s power of producing representations from itself,  
the  spontaneity of knowledge should be called understanding. Our nature is so constituted that our 
intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are effected by 
objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the 
understanding (Kant 1929: B 75, A 51).
The basis of understanding lies, for Kant, in the synthetic a priori of knowledge, that 
is,  the  way  in  which  the  conceptual  side  of  our  perception  synthesises  the 
representations  the  mind  receives  of  the  world  into  experience  and  knowledge 
(Thornton 2004: 10-1). For this process to yield cognitions, we have to be able to 
make judgements.  The ‘function’  of a concept,  for Kant,  is  to place what  several 
intuitions have in common under one common representation and it takes an act of 
judgement to bring them under concepts (Schmaus 2004: 42). Hence Kant provided a 
‘psychological  solution’  to  the  dilemma  that  Descartes  left  philosophers  with,  his 
‘transcendental  logic  reduces  validity  to  the  synthesis  of  representations,  to  the 
description of processes of consciousness’ (Rose 1981: 3).
Kant’s formulation of the relation between mind and world has left philosophy ever 
since, as McDowell (1994: 9) observes, with an ‘interminable oscillation’ between 
two positions. Philosophers either have to base their ideas about mind and world on 
‘theories of coherence’ where there it is assumed that there is no friction between 
thought and the world, or accept the ‘myth of the given’ and construe the natural and 
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social world independent of human subjectivity.  The only way to escape from this 
interminable oscillation, according to McDowell (1994: 3), is when we recognise that 
philosophers all along have been mistaken in assuming that there has never been a 
gulf between mind and world that has to be bridged. 
McDowell’s radical reconceptualisation of the relation between mind and world raises 
new questions and issues about this  relation in  philosophy,  and about  the relation 
between theory and practice in vocational curricula and pedagogy. However, before 
exploring these issues, the paper discusses the legacy of Kant’s ideas about mind and 
world in relation to recent debates about the situated basis of knowledge and learning 
in VE.
Kant, ‘situativity’ and VE
It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  try  to  trace  the  extent  to  which  Kant’s 
philosophy may have influenced the formation of the relation between theory and 
practice in VE. Given that the focus of the paper is post-Lave and Wenger VE, I will 
offer a much more circumscribed account and restrict my comments about Kant to his 
influence  on  the  recent  debates  about  ‘situativity’  and  the  concept  of  vocational 
knowledge.
One  of  Lave  and  Wenger’s  main  concerns  was  to  draw attention  to  the  situated 
character  of  knowledge  production  and reproduction.  They set  about  this  task  by 
trying to decentre learning from what they perceived as the unduly influential ‘folk 
dichotomy’ between ‘learning by doing and learning by abstraction’ (Guile 2005). In 
doing  so,  they  sought  to  move  the  focus  away  from  teachers’  pedagogic  intent 
towards a view of learning as a form of situated activity dependent on participation in 
communities of practice. 
The reason that Lave and Wenger wanted to view all forms of knowledge as forms of 
situated  practice  was  to  challenge  the  two  harmful  myths  perpetuated  by  the 
acceptance of the folk dichotomy in contemporary learning theory. The first myth is 
that learning consists of the acquisition of abstract representations made available to 
us  through  formally  organised  curricula.  The  second  myth  is  that  we  use  these 
representations  to  as  rules  to  solve  problems  that  arise  outside  schools,  colleges, 
training workshop etc. 
When Lave and Wenger’s intentions are stated in these terms it is possible to detect 
the way in which they were engaging with Kant’s legacy, albeit a somewhat hidden 
legacy, in vocational curriculum and pedagogy. Kant held, as we saw earlier, that the 
mind already has within it the means to construct the world, he maintained that our 
representations  provided  a  correspondence  to  the  external  world,  and  that  our 
judgements allowed us to subsume intuitions under concepts. 
This idea about the centrality of representations to human thinking has informed the 
development  of  cognitive  psychology  which,  in  turn,  has  exercised  a  dominant 
influence in contemporary learning theory (Lave 1988). One of the main assumptions 
of cognitive psychology is that:
‘all understanding consists of forming and using appropriate symbolic representations. For Descartes  
these representations were complex descriptions built up out of primitive ideas or elements. Kant added 
the important idea that all concepts are rules for relating such elements (Dreyfuss 1992: 23).
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The  entities  that  we  imagine  are  inside  our  mind  are  therefore  modelled  on  a 
particular class of entities that are outside the mind: symbolic representations which 
we use to make judgements about our experience of the world.
The centrality of representation within cognitive psychology has had a number  of 
consequences.  In the case of learning theory,  it  has underpinned the idea that  the 
purpose  of  the  curriculum  is  to  transmit  abstract  decontextualised  knowledge  to 
learners (Lave 1988: 86). This results in a view of mind as a repository of stored 
knowledge, theoretical knowledge as the stock of expert representations that we can 
use  as  a  set  of  rules  or  maxims  to  make  sense  of  our  practical  experience,  and 
expertise as the application of such maxims (Lave 1988: 91). In the case of VE, it has 
contributed to the idea that knowledge consists  of abstract  representations that we 
apply  within  the  ‘real’  world  being  ingrained  in  the  design  of  the  ‘standard’ 
vocational curricula in most advanced industrial countries (Hager 2003).
In rejecting the dualism of learning by doing and learning by abstraction, Lave and 
Wenger were explicitly rejecting the legacy of the Kantian psychological solution to 
the relation between the mind and world.  Specifically, they were rejecting dominant 
assumptions in cognitive psychology about the central role of representations in the 
process of learning, and that we use the abstract representations we acquire from the 
curriculum as  maxims  for  action  in  the  workplace. Lave  and Wenger  (1991:  98) 
proposed instead that the concept of representation should be replaced by the idea that 
‘participation in expert practice’ is the ‘epistemological principle of learning’. They 
deemed participation to be epistemological because it is the changes in the mode of 
participation that enables us to operate effectively in different contexts (Guile 2005).
What is clear is that the impetus behind the critique that Lave and Wenger initiated of 
cognitive  psychology  has  inspired  many  researchers  in  VE to  shift  from viewing 
learning as  a  process  of  acquisition  to  viewing it  as  a  process  of  participation  in 
situated  practice.  Researchers  have  identified:  the  social  practices,  for  example, 
‘guided  participation’,  that  facilitate  learning  in  workplaces  (Billet  2003);  the 
environments, for example, ‘expansive and restrictive’, that facilitate different forms 
of learning in workplaces (Fuller and Unwin 2003); the extend to which workplaces 
offer ‘affordances’ that invite workers to participate in workplace practices (Billett 
2003),  the  ‘tacit’  dimension  of  workplace  learning  (Evans  et  al.  2003),  and  the 
‘unintentional’ forms of learning that occur in workplaces (Hodkinson and Hodkinson 
2003).
Despite  the enormous  value of this  work in  revealing  the complex way in which 
context mediates workplace learning, one consequences of this preoccupation with the 
process of learning is that the relation between the vocational curriculum, vocational 
pedagogy and the workplace has slipped out of view. In many ways, this is hardly 
surprising;  the  force  of  Lave’s  (1988:  76-7)  critique  of  the  dualism  between 
‘scientific’  (hereafter  theoretical)  and  ‘everyday’  thinking,  coupled  with  her  and 
Wenger’s critique of the legacy of this folk dichotomy in learning theory, appeared to 
have forever negated the validity of this distinction. 
The problem with Lave and Wenger’s critique is that they develop their critique of the 
folk  dichotomy between  learning by doing and learning  by abstraction  as  though 
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cognitive psychology provides the definitive conception of the relation between those 
two forms of learning. The irony of their position is that in emphasising the centrality 
of practice to epistemology,  Lave and Wenger overlook that there is an alternative 
‘practice-based’ conception of the relation between mind and world and hence theory 
and  practice,  that  is  not  characterised by  Kantian  ‘transcendental’  and 
‘representational’  assumptions. The primary figure behind the development  of this 
conception is Vygogtsky (Derry 2003).
Vygotsky, activity and knowledge
Vygotsky’s theory of cultural mediation is predicated on a non-dualistic account of 
the  development  of  mind,  a  rejection  of  the  Kantian  assumptions  of  the 
representational  paradigm  and  an  appreciation  of  the  interdependence  between 
theoretical and everyday concepts (Guile 2005). The guiding idea is that cognition 
develops through engaging with a world laden with meaning and significance, rather 
than a world bereft of meaning as Kant assumed (Vygotsky’s (1987: 145-46). From 
this  perspective,  we  use  historically  and  cultural  constituted  tools,  for  example 
language,  systems  for  counting,  mnemonic  techniques,  algebraic  symbol  systems, 
writing, works of art, to mediate our relation with the natural and social environment. 
The  emphasis  upon  mediation,  that  is,  an  understanding  how  culture  enters 
psychological processes and shapes behaviour, allowed Vygotsky to reveal that one of 
the most distinctive features of human consciousness is that we control our behaviour 
from the  outside.  We develop ourselves  through using external  symbolic,  cultural 
systems. As a consequence, we are able to conceive of the situations in which we find 
ourselves as demanding a certain course of action, to question the correctness of their 
conception in the light of previous experience, and to project and evaluate alternative 
procedures.
By  conceptualising  culture  in  this  way,  Vygotsky  anticipated  the  limitations  of 
cognitive accounts of the human mind even though his theory of cultural mediation 
was  formulated  before  the  development  of  cognitive  psychology.  The  basis  of 
Vygotsky’s critique is his recognition that the Kantian notion of representation, which 
lies  at  the  heart  of  cognitive  psychology,  is  inadequate  to  express  the  connection 
between things. It assumes that it is the representation itself which is responsible for 
disclosing  the  connections  and  relations  that  shape  and  inform the  object  of  our 
thought or action. Instead Vygotsky argued that we must not seek the solution to the 
relation between mind and world:
‘in general representations, not in absolute perceptions and orthoscopic diagrams, not even in concrete 
verbal images that replace the general representations – we must seek it in a system of judgements in 
which the concept is disclosed (Vygotsky 1988: 55).’
Thus Vygotsky is arguing that we have to understand the system of connections that 
exists between concepts and their representations before we are in a position to infer 
what follows from knowing a specific concept. 
In making this argument about the ‘inferential’ purpose of concepts, Vygotsky, unlike 
Lave and Wenger, using the concept of activity as an explanatory principle of the 
genesis  and relation  of  theoretical  and everyday concepts.  Thus,  from Vygotsky’s 
perspective, we do not have to abandon this distinction because it does not reflect a 
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dualism,  rather  it  reflects  the  different  outcomes  that  flow  from  the  specialised 
activities in which we engage (Guile 2005). 
This epistemological position allows Vygotsky to identify not only what is distinctive 
about theoretical and everyday concepts, but also their interdependent relation to one 
another. Both types of concepts, for Vygotsky, allow us to maintain a relation to the 
world; however, the system of knowledge in which theoretical concepts are located 
provides  us with a  way of  disclosing relations  about  knowledge and practice  that 
otherwise  remain  obscured  from sensory  perception.  Theoretical  concepts,  unlike 
everyday concepts, ‘reposition’ us in relation to different fields of knowledge and to 
practice as well as to offer us possibilities for acting differently in relation to both of  
them (Guile 2005). The implications of this claim will be returned to at a later stage in 
the paper.
The reason that Lave and Wenger fail to appreciate Vygotsky’s non-dualistic account 
of  the  development  of  mind  and  inferential  theory  of  learning  that  respects  the 
distinctions  between  theoretical  and  everyday  concepts,  is  because  they  miss  the 
significance of the ‘Hegelian provenance’ of his epistmological position (Derry 2003: 
14). This predisposed Vygotsky, unlike Kant, to be sensitive to the way in which the 
foundations of theoretical knowledge are historically and culturally built up through 
the different specialised forms of activity in which we engage and subject to constant 
revision through those specialised forms of activity.
It appears, therefore, that Lave and Wenger have been overly hasty in their dismissal 
of the distinction between theoretical and everyday concepts. Vygotsky’s use of the 
concept  of activity  as an explanatory principle  for the relation  between mind and 
world, allowed him to reveal the mediated basis of that relation, without having to 
reject the distinction between theoretical and everyday concepts. This introduces a 
potentially  fruitful  way  of  re-thinking  the  relation  between  vocational  curricula, 
vocational pedagogy and workplace practice. Before pursuing this possibility further, 
it is necessary to turn to the reservations that have been expressed about Lave and 
Wenger’s  legacy  in  VE;  not  least  because  in  expressing  these  reservations  some 
writers  have  attempted  to  restore  the  concept  of  theoretical  knowledge  to  the 
mainstream debate about vocational learning.
Vocational knowledge and pedagogy
Conceptions of vocational knowledge
In  a  recent  discussion  of  the  concept  of  vocational  knowledge,  Young  (2003) 
addresses the ‘process-based’ of conception of vocational knowledge that is currently 
dominant in VE. The fullest expression of this approach to vocational knowledge or in 
his terms ‘vocational knowing’ is found in the work of Stephen Billet (2001; 2003). 
Billet  defines  vocational  knowing  through  a  discussion  of  sociogenesis  in  socio-
cultural  theory.  Billett  distinguishes  between  four  lines  of  development  -  the 
phylogenetic,  the sociocultural,  the microgenetic  and the ontogenetic,  arguing that 
vocational knowing emerges out of the interplay between all of these four lines of 
development as we participate in specific forms of workplace practice. 
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knowing is held to be and active and reciprocal process engaging with the world beyond the physical  
self and drawing together both knowledge ‘how’, and knowledge ‘what’ (Billett 2001: 433).
This conceptualisation of knowing, according to Billett, constitutes a shift away from 
categories of knowledge which are held as ‘entities that act upon’ the world, towards 
an emphasis on the ‘intrapsychological attributes (i.e. problem solving) that enable us 
to act within the world.
Young  (2003:  193)  expresses  a  number  of  reservations  about  this  conception  of 
vocational knowing. He argues that although Billett acknowledges that his conception 
of knowing presupposes the drawing together of both knowledge how and knowledge 
what, it appears as though the latter is merely a form of in situ knowledge acquired 
through vocational practice. This leaves learners, according to Young, bereft of the 
type of resources that the vocational curriculum has historically made available that 
enables  them  to  make  connections  to  other  events,  experiences  and  bodies  of 
knowledge beyond the immediate situation they find themselves. In doing so, learners 
are denied the resources to ‘predict and project beyond the present and to conceive of 
alternatives’. The process-based conception of vocational knowledge is, for Young, a 
valuable but only ‘partial perspective’: it alerts us to the variety of levels of practice 
that shape and inform vocational knowing, however, it remains silent about the value 
of theoretical knowledge for practice.
To reintroduce the idea that ‘knowledge relates to reality in ways that transcend the 
conditions of its production’, Young (2003: 194) argues for a ‘social realist’ stance 
towards vocational knowledge. He invokes Bernstein’s (2000) distinctions between 
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ knowledge to clarify the basis of this social realist stance 
(Young 2003:  196).  These distinctions  emerge  from the  ‘language of  description’ 
Bernstein introduced - ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ discourses to differentiate between 
the  two forms  of  knowledge  that  he  felt  are  characteristic  of  advanced  industrial 
societies. Young (2003: 196-7), following Bernstein, defines horizontal discourse as 
‘local, segmented and context bound’, and vertical discourse as ‘general, explicit and 
coherent,  expressed  in  hierarchically  organised  bodies  of  knowledge  such  as  the 
natural  sciences  or  segmentally  organised  into  specialised  languages  such  as  the 
humanities and social sciences’. 
The main characteristic of vertical knowledge compared to horizontal knowledge is 
that it has specific knowledge structures that provide it with explicit principles that 
enable such knowledge to be recontextualised. Horizontal knowledge, however, does 
not  have  knowledge  structures  as  such;  thus  it  cannot  embody  any  principles  of 
recontextualisation’  and is  therefore  less susceptible  to transcending its  context  of 
origin (Young 2003: 197). 
In glossing over the theoretical component of vocational knowledge distinction, the 
process-based  approach,  as  Young  (2003:  197)  observes,  generate  a  number  of 
problems  for  VE.  The  first  problem  is  that  the  vocational  curriculum  in  most 
advanced industrial  countries  is  predicated  on the idea of  providing learners  with 
forms of knowledge that are relevant to the challenges they are likely to confront in 
the workplace (Onstenk 1988). This suggests that it is important to assist learners to 
understand the different internal structuring, contents and purposes of theoretical (i.e. 
vertical) and everyday (i.e. horizontal) forms of knowledge’ otherwise they are likely 
to experience difficulty in grasping the relation of the two forms to one another. The 
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second problem follows from the first: the different structuring, contents and purposes 
of knowledge have implications for how both forms of knowledge may be acquired 
and related through vocational pedagogy. It is only when learners can see the different 
contribution  that  each  form of  knowledge  makes  to  workplace  practice,  they  are 
likely, to paraphrase Schon (1978: 3), to continue to oscillate between viewing theory 
as  the  academic  ‘highground’  and  practice  as  the  ‘swampland’  encountered  in 
workplaces.
The  distinctions  between  vertical  and  horizontal  knowledge,  according  to  Young 
(2003:  198)  point  to  the  need  for  new  pedagogic  strategies  that  go  beyond  an 
emphasis  on  participation  in  practice.  He  suggests  that  it  may  be  helpful  to 
differentiate between ‘principled’ (i.e. general explanations) or ‘procedural’ (i.e. the 
location  of  particular  instances)  pedagogic  strategies,  however,  he  but  does  not 
explore how these two pedagogic notions might relate to one another. To shed some 
light on why it might be difficult develop a vocational pedagogy from the position 
Young has  articulated,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  significance  of  Durkheim’s 
genealogy of knowledge for Young’s suggestions about vocational pedagogy.
Durkheim’s genealogy of knowledge and its implications for vocational pedagogy
The concepts of vertical and horizontal knowledge are, according to Bernstein (1996: 
145), based on the two orders of meaning that Durkheim found in the societies he 
studied:  the  ‘sacred’  (conceptual  codified  knowledge)  and  the  ‘profane’  (our 
immediate response to the world). Bernstein’s distinctions are therefore best thought 
of as a reworking of Durkheim’s original binary distinctions to provide, ‘a way of 
talking about forms of knowledge’ to avoid the tendency in social constructionism to 
‘reduce all differences of cultural content to the play of power and interest’ (Muller 
2003: 138-9).
Durkheim attached great significance to the systems of categories characteristic of 
‘primitive’ religion and it served as the starting-point for his genealogy of knowledge 
(Callincos 1999: 142). For Durkheim, society:
was not a model classificatory thought followed; it was its own division which served as divisions for  
the system of classification. The first logical categories were social categories, the first classes of things 
were classes of men into which these things were integrated (Durkheim 1963: 40-1).
So for Durkheim, just as the distinction between the sacred and the profane evolved as 
we set apart religious festivals from profane seasons of work, the other most basic 
categories of human thought, for example, space, time, and causality were also social 
in character (Schmaus 2004: 121). 
This  line  of  thinking  led  Durkheim  to  follow  Kant  and  affirm  the  universality, 
necessity and authority  of human thought,  but  to  argue that  he was misguided in 
assuming that the mind could transcend experience and impose on though universal 
and binding categories of reason (Cladis 2001: xxv). Thus Durkheim rejected Kant’s 
claim that the application of the fundamental categories of thought and faculties of 
mind can be used to explain the  a priori  conditions of judgement (Rose 1981: 15). 
Instead Durkheim argued that mental capacities and the origin and employment of the 
categories we employ to make sense of the world presuppose social organisation. 
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If  men did  not  agree  upon these  essential  ideas  at  every  moment,  if  they  did  not  have  the  same  
conception  of  time and  space,  cause  and  number,  etc.,  all  contact  between  their  minds would  be  
impossible, and with that, all life together. Thus society could abandon the categories to the free choice 
of individuals without abandoning itself (Durkheim 1965: 22). 
In making this claim, Durkheim went further than Kant and explicitly stated that not 
only are  these categories  social,  but  also that  their  ‘collective  representations’  are 
universal and by virtue of their origin invested with a prestige which means that they 
have the power to impose themselves’ (Durkheim 1955: 85).
The reason that collective representations had this intrinsic power was that:
‘some categories and concepts – or as Durkheim sometimes called them, collective representations – 
became autonomous, existing independently of any specific religious world view. This is how science 
and logic acquired their objective vocabulary, their system of concepts (Cladis 2001: xxv).’
This assumption about the link between collective representation and shared meaning 
led Durkheim to argue that, as Rose (1981: 15) observes: that the ‘collective being’, 
the origin of the moral force which confers validity on social institutions or social 
facts,  is  underivable,  ‘sui  generis’.  So society  sui  generis  became,  for  Durkheim, 
constitutive of the validity of judgements we make about the natural and social world.
Thus, Durkheim turned Kant’s original transcendental argument on its head. Instead 
of maintaining that it is the synthesising qualities of the mind that are responsible for 
the production of objective knowledge, Durkheim argue that it is society or culture 
which  confers  objective  validity  on ‘social  facts’.  In  doing so,  his  own argument 
acquires  a  ‘quasi-transcendental’  structure  (Rose  1981:  14).  The  newly  specified 
social  or  cultural  a  priori  becomes  the  precondition  of  Durkheim’s  categories  of 
knowledge. This precondition, however, is informed by a quasi-Kantian sense of the 
transcendental;  it  is  external  to  the  mind,  it  has  acquired  the  status  of  a  natural, 
contingent,  empirical  object  and,  despite  its  intrinsic  sociality,  it  leaves  the  mind 
separate from the world and hence theory separate from practice.
Where does the legacy of the quasi-transcendental structure of Durkheim’s argument 
about the social basis of knowledge leave Young’s suggestion that the distinctions 
between  vertical  and  horizontal  knowledge  help  us  to  categorise  vocational 
knowledge  and  identify  criteria  for  vocational  pedagogy?  Certainly,  it  does  not 
undermine the value of distinguishing between forms of knowledge in terms of the 
different  purposes  they  serve,  their  different  epistemological  foundations  and  the 
different social practices we have to learn to use them effectively.
It does nevertheless leave us with the problem, to paraphrase and extend Muller’s 
(2003: 137), that just as no one ever lived only in the world of the sacred or the 
profane, vocational practice never involves us working with vertical knowledge in a 
way that is totally separate from horizontal knowledge because:
Neither the everyday world nor the world of science is epistemologically homogeneous. Indeed, argues 
Latour  (1993),  science  has  always  comprised  ‘hybrid  monsters’,  productively  mixing  science  and 
society (Muller 2003: 137).
The acceptance  that  epistemological  domains  are  not  coterminous  with vocational 
practice raises two critically important questions: do the above observations mean that 
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all forms of knowledge are ultimately hybridical? And, if so, does that means that the 
advocates of the process-based conception of vocational knowledge were correct in 
claiming that all forms of knowledge are equivalent social practices? Well the short 
answer is no. It is quite possible to maintain, as Muller (2003: 137) points out, that 
although  the  boundaries  between  vertical  and  horizontal  are  ‘permeable’  and that 
vertical  and horizontal  knowledge might ‘nest’ in one another, this does not mean 
conceding anything about the ‘epistemological integrity’ of the former compared to 
the latter. The concept of vertical knowledge offers us a way to avoid the ‘arbitrary 
conceptual relations’ that are generated by ‘changing experiential particulars’ (Muller 
2003: 132). 
The quasi-transcendental nature of Durkheim’s argument about the relation between 
mind and world poses a problem for Young’s argument about vocational pedagogy. It 
leaves  us oscillating between principled and procedural  pedagogic strategies  in an 
attempt to connect vertical and horizontal knowledge. The reason for this dilemma is 
that  this  pedagogic  stance  denies  us  any  criteria  to  mediate  these  two  forms  of 
knowledge.  To  understand  how we  might  tackle  this  it  is  necessary  to  return  to 
Vygotsky. 
Vygotsky, mediation and knowledge
Vygotsky  (1978:  231)  also  distinguished  between  two  forms  of  knowledge  – 
theoretical and everyday knowledge, and accepted,  like Durkheim, that the former 
enabled us to avoid the arbitrary conceptual relations that are generated by sensory 
perception. Vygotsky maintained that although theoretical and everyday knowledge 
gave us access to different types of knowledge, they are still related to one another. 
Vygotsky,  following  Hegel,  accepted  that  in  different  periods,  different  criteria 
prevailed and that what counted as knowledge was dependent on those criteria (Derry 
2003:  149).  This  emphasis  on  the  historicity  of  knowledge  does  not  mean  that 
Vygotsky  entertained  a  relativist  epistemological  position.  Rather,  as  Vygotsky 
(1997) demonstrated in his famous essay ‘The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in 
Psychology’,  once we acknowledge the historicity of knowledge we can appreciate 
that it  is the conceptual foundations established as forms of theoretical knowledge 
move through phases of early development towards maturity that provides the basis 
for further development.
This emphasis on the historicity of knowledge did not mean that Vygotsky assumed 
that  theoretical  concepts  emerged  as  the  result  of  a  social  or  cultural  a priori  as 
Durkheim believed. Vygotsky argued instead that the reason theoretical concepts arise 
in historically constituted specialist fields is because ‘experts in those fields use the 
activities,  techniques  and  procedures  of  theoretical  inquiry  to  prise  reality  into 
expressing itself in forms which do not exist without it’ (Derry 2003). Thus Vygotsky, 
unlike  Durkheim,  avoided  the  problem  of  seeing  collective  representations  as 
purported representations of a truth that imposes itself on us. He instead maintained 
that theoretical concepts are part of an inferentially connected system of concepts, and 
it is this system of judgements that is responsible for providing theoretical concepts 
with their capacity for generalisation.
From  Vygotsky’s  perspective,  when  we  learn  theoretical  concepts  we  are  not 
acquiring representations, rather we are being ‘repositioned’ to act differently in the 
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world (Guile 2005). Vygotsky identified two senses in which we are repositioned. The 
first sense arises from our discovery that we can identify that givenness is a variable 
feature  of  the  natural  and social  world.  Theoretical  concepts  allow us  to  see  the 
connections and relations between things that otherwise appear to sensory perception 
to be free-standing objects or events. 
Grasping  connections  presupposes  that  we  understand  the  generalisation  that  is 
contained within a theoretical concept. The essence of such generalisations is not an 
abstraction from the world as Lave and Wenger maintained, rather:
‘it is the enrichment of the reality that it represents, in the enrichment of what is given in immediate  
sensual perception and contemplation. However, this enrichment of the immediate perception of reality 
by  generalisation  can  only  occur  if  complex  connections,  dependencies,  and  relationships  are 
established between the objects represented in concepts and the rest of reality. By its very nature, each  
concept presupposes the presence of certain systems of concepts.  Outside such a system, it  cannot 
exist’.
Vygotsky (1997: 224)
At first sight this may appear to resemble Durkheim’s position. To appreciate why 
this is not the case, we have to consider the second sense in which Vygotsky claimed 
that learning theoretical concepts repositions us. This form of repositioning arises as 
we begin to construct our understanding of theoretical concepts upon the foundation 
provided  by  our  existing  everyday  or  theoretical  concepts.  This  ‘conceptual 
restructuring’  occurs  because  when  we  learn  a  new  theoretical  concept  it  never 
wholly nullifies our existing concepts; in contrast, it results in our existing concepts 
‘acquiring whole series of new relationships’ with the new concept (Vygotsky 1987: 
223). 
Vygotsky (1998: 56) pursued the implications of his insight by pointing out that the 
common  pedagogic  assumption  is  that  theoretical  concepts  are  taught  in  schools, 
colleges  and  universities  in  their  ‘pure’  form,  that  is,  their  main  features  and 
relationships are described to students. From this perspective, learners are assumed to 
assimilate  or  acquire  concepts  in  that  pure  form (Sfard  ).  The  problem with  this 
pedagogic conception is  that  we never assimilate  nor reason with concepts in this 
form. Because our interpretation of a theoretical  concept  is mediated by our prior 
concepts, this process of mediaton inevitably affects the way in which we come to 
understand and use a new theoretical  concept.  For example,  the way in which we 
understand the measure of generality contained within a theoretical concept in the 
field of electronics restructures the set of possible operations for how we use that 
concept  in  theoretical  discourse.  It  also  restructures  our  existing  everyday 
understanding  of  electronics,  enabling  the  former  to  be  used  in  a  new and more 
encompassing way. 
Thus Vygotsky, like Bernstein and Young, accepts that it is sociologically valuable to 
maintain  the  difference  between  theoretical  (i.e.  vertical)  and  everyday  (i.e. 
horizontal) concepts. Where he goes a step further than those writers is in revealing 
why it  is  possible to simultaneously accept  the sociological  separation of  and  the 
pedagogic  relation  between  those  concepts.  This  cornerstone  of  this  pedagogic 
relation  is  the  process  of  conceptual  restructuring.  Our  understanding  of  the 
generalisation contained in a theoretical concept is always: 
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‘partial because each new stage of generalisation emerges from the generalisation that was generalised 
in the previous structure of objects. It arises as a generalisation of generalisations, not as a new mode of 
generalisation of isolated objects.  The result  of previous efforts of thought which are expressed in 
generalisation that dominate the previous states do not come to naught. They are included in the new 
work of thought. They are the prerequisites for it’.
Vygotsky (1987:229)
To understand the process of conceptual restructuring, that is, the way in which the 
generalisation that dominated in our previous mental state becomes included in the 
new work of thought, it is necessary to turn to the work of John McDowell and Robert 
Brandom.  This  work originated  as an neo-Hegelian  engagement  with problems in 
analytical  philosophy,  however,  when  allied  to  Vygotsky’s  theory  of  cultural 
mediation, it enables us to move beyond viewing vocational learning as subsuming 
intuitions  under  representations,  participation  in  social  practice  and  connecting 
principles and procedures. Instead it allows a new conception of learning based on the 
social  practice  of  inference  to  emerge,  a  conception,  moreover,  that  offers  new 
principles for vocational pedagogy. 
The ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘social practice of giving and asking for ‘reasons’
McDowell  is  concerned with the relation  between mind and world and hence the 
nature and limits of knowledge. His starting point was the interminable oscillation that 
Kant’s  insight  ‘That  thoughts  without  contents  are  empty,  and  intuitions  without 
concepts  are  blind’  had  generated  in  philosophy.  What  is  distinctive  about 
McDowell’s  (1994:3)  position  is  that  he maintains  there  is  no gulf  to  be bridged 
between mind and world. He explains why this is the case, like Vygotsky, by focusing 
on how we use concepts to mediate the relation between mind and world. Using the 
example of colour, McDowell makes a two-fold argument about the mediated basis of 
our relation  to  the world.  To offer any testimony of our experience of colour  we 
already need to know a great deal about, for instance, the effect of different sorts of 
illumination on colour appearances, and once we understand the meaning of a concept 
we no longer have to rely on perception. Instead we are able to use concepts to help us 
to offer reasons as to why, for example, colour has certain effects in the sunlight.
This line of argument presupposes knowledge of concepts that originate outside the 
immediate  delivery  of  the  senses  and an  appreciation  of  the  way in  which  those 
concepts  help  to  restructure  our  understanding  of  experience.  So,  for  McDowell 
(1995: 891),  there is  ‘no making sense of that  possibility unless one’s conceptual 
space already embraces a world with more to it that is immediately present to the 
senses’.
McDowell (1994: xiv) reformulates Sellars’ concept of the ‘space of reasons’ to allow 
us to see that the way we are caught up in the natural world already involves the  
exercise  of  conceptual  capacities.  In  McDowell’s  terms,  experience  is  already 
conceptualised: it is not the result of the clothing in concepts something given in non-
conceptual form nor is it a form of un-mediated practice. 
‘In characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving a logical description of 
that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to 
justify what one says’ (McDowell (1994: xiv). 
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The space of reasons provides the normative context that makes knowledge possible 
and allows it to exist outside us in the social world we inhabit. 
So, for McDowell, when we engage in any judgement of our experience of the world 
our  conceptual  capacities  are  not  exercised  on  non-conceptual  deliverance  of 
sensibility. He invokes the term the ‘unbounded of the conceptual’ to convey the idea 
that  conceptual  capacities  are  already  operative  in  the  deliverance  of  sensibility 
themselves’. Experience is not, in other words, an apprehension of raw data, rather it 
is an awareness that ‘things are thus and so’ (McDowell 1994: 26). 
McDowell’s idea about the space of reasons allows us to make Vygotsly’s argument 
about  conceptual  restructuring  more  explicit  and to  anticipate  its  implications  for 
vocational  pedagogy.  The  cornerstone  of  conceptual  restructuring  is,  according  to 
Vygotsky, that our understanding of the generalisation contained within a theoretical 
concept is built upon our prior foundations of knowledge. These foundations consist 
of our own personalisation of theoretical and everyday generalisations and, as such, 
influence the way to understand and subsequently use the new generalisation when 
speaking and thinking. McDowell helps us to clarify Vygotsky’s claim that theoretical 
concepts act back on everyday concepts by highlighting that our new understanding is 
only meaningful  when we can  locate  that  meaning  in  the  space  of  reasons.  Thus 
McDowell helps us to see is that we are able to place an object, event or concept in 
the space of reasons is because it offers a normative context for judging such matters.  
To understand how we form such judgements, we have to turn to Robert Brandom.
Brandom (1995:  895)  endorses  McDowell’s  central  claim  that  knowledge  can  be 
understood as standing in the space of reasons, however, he supplements McDowell’s 
reformulation of Sellars’ position by drawing attention to the social practices that help 
us to accomplish such understandings. For Brandom (1995: 896), when we talk about 
concepts as being places in the space of reasons we are talking about ‘things that can 
in principle be given as reasons, and for which reasons can in principle be asked’. 
This means that we have to be able to move thought and/or action in the space of 
reasons by mediating between differentially elicited responses and situating them in a 
‘network  of  inferential  relations’  that  are  historically  and  socially  constituted. 
Knowing what follows from an utterance, action or an event presupposes, according 
to Brandom (2000: 65), the social practice of ‘giving and asking for reasons’.
The  guiding  idea  behind  giving  and  asking  for  reasons  is  that  we  strive  in  any 
situation  to  pick  out  what  is  ‘propositionally  contentful’  in  spoken  or  written 
communications, that is, whatever can serve as both a premise and a conclusion in 
inference (Brandom 2000: 65). Thus, from Brandom’s perspective, representations are 
meaningful when we can locate them in the space of reasons thereby allowing others 
to draw inferences from them. 
The link between the social articulation of the space of reasons and the social practice 
of giving and asking for reasons helps to clarify a number of issues that were left 
unresolved in process-based and neo-Durkheimian VE and more recently in the work 
of other philosophers such as Beckett (2004) who have drawn on Brandom’s ideas 
about inference. The first issue is that we require a specific form of knowledgeability 
to mediate between theoretical and everyday knowledge. The primary feature of this 
knowledgeability is to engage in the social practice of giving and asking for reasons. 
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It is our ability to participate in this social practice that enables us to recognise what 
we can infer about the typicality or otherwise of discourse, an object or an activity. 
There  is,  therefore,  a  clear  link  between  what  we  know  and  how  we  use  that 
knowledge.  From  Brandom’s  perspective,  the  classic  Rylian  distinction  between 
‘know what’ (i.e. codified knowledge) and ‘know how’ (i.e. practical knowledge) that 
underpins  much  thinking  about  vocational  knowledge  (Hager  2000;  Schon  1978) 
creates a completely misleading picture. They are not separate and different forms of 
knowledge acquired in independently of one another, rather they are related to one 
another dialectically. 
This observation anticipates the second issue about the social practice of giving and 
asking  for  reasons.  That  even  when  we  acquire  some  form  of  knowledge 
noninferentially,  for  example,  taking something for  granted  or  being  instructed  to 
believe  something  to  be  true,  with  the  result  that  we  are  unable  to  justify  that 
knowledge, reason is still in play. To be capable of making a claim about something 
or to even to believe it:
‘requires that we understand it: that we have at least a rough practical mastery of its inferential role, the 
know-how to discriminate some things that follow from it and others that don’t, and some things that 
would be evidence for it and others that would not’.
Brandom (1995: 905)
Thus, Brandom makes the basis of McDowell’s claims about the unboundedness of 
the conceptual clear: when we acquire something noninferentially we use the space of 
reasons to identify what is propositionally contentful, and to articulate inferentially 
and  socially  what  does  and  does  not  follow  from  our  understanding  of  those 
propositions.  
In demonstrating the link between communicative social practice and the space of 
reasons, it becomes clear that we use concepts to act and communicate inferentially, 
that  is,  they  are  able  to  respond  differentially  to  actions,  events  and  thoughts. 
Responding differentially  in  Brandom’s  terms  means  knowing what  follows  from 
adopting a particular position or accepting a specific belief. 
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the main problem in post Lave and Wenger VE is the 
disappearance of any discussion of the relation between theory and practice. It has 
traced the roots of this problem to the legacy of Kant’s conception of this relation in 
cognitive psychology,  and to  Lave and Wenger’s  critique  of the latter’s  specific 
conception of the relation between theory and practice. The net effect of the Lave 
and  Wenger  critique  has  been  to  assert  that  the  concepts  developed  through 
theoretical  and everyday  practices  are  equivalent  forms  of  knowledge;  to  either 
gloss over or leave in a very underdeveloped state the discussion of the pedagogic 
strategies required to assist learners to mediate between theory and practice; and to 
shift the focus of research away from the relation between the vocational curriculum 
and vocational practice towards workplace learning.
The  paper  has  argued  that  the  basis  of  an  alternative  practice  or  activity  based 
conception of the relation between theory and practice can be found in the work of 
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Vygotsky, McDowell and Brandom. The paper has maintained that it is possible to 
develop a holistic theory of the relation between mind and world that does not force 
us  to  follow  Lave  and  Wenger  abandon  the  distinction  between  theoretical  and 
everyday concepts.  That this holistic conception of the relation between mind and 
world means that the distinction between theoretical and everyday concepts does not 
reflect  a  dualism,  rather  it  reflects  the  different  outcomes  that  flow  from  the 
specialised  activities  in  which  we  engage.  And  that  when  we  learn  to  mediate 
theoretical and everyday concepts by using the social practice of giving and asking for 
reasons to locate the mediated outcome in the space of reasons.
Implications for vocational curriculum
The  conclusions  presented  above  have  a  number  of  implications  for  vocational 
curriculum. It implies a series of shift  in the principles that informs the design of 
vocational curricula. The shifts are from:
 a curriculum based on the notion of representation (i.e. concepts as abstractions 
from the world) to a curriculum based on the notion of inferentialism (i.e. concepts as 
cultural tools that allow us to act in the world through giving reasons);
 a focus on the acquisition of representations (i.e. fixed meaning) to a focus on 
conceiving of theoretical concepts as cultural tools that reposition us in relation to 
practice  and  other  concepts  in  different  ways  (i.e.   developmental  conception  of 
meaning and practice);
 a view of the purpose of theoretical concepts as abstractions from the world (i.e. 
disconnected from practice) to conceiving of them as cultural tools that we can use to 
inform our goal-orientated practice.
Implications for vocational pedagogy
The preceding analysis also has a number of implications for vocational pedagogy. It 
implies a series of shift in the principles that informs our understanding of the relation 
between theory and practice. The shifts are from:
 conceiving of practice as un-mediated (i.e. pre-conceptual) to grasping the way in 
which practice is already mediated (i.e. the unboundedness of the conceptual);
 conceiving  of  practice-based learning (i.e.  know how)  as  requiring  a  different 
pedagogy from theoretical learning (i.e. know what), to grasping that all forms of 
learning presupposes the social practice of reasoning;
 conceiving of theoretical concepts as cultural tools that we apply in practice to 
seeing such tools as resources to appraise practice critically.
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